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EARL POLLOCK
CERTIORARI AND HABEAS CORPUS: THE COMITY COMEDY
Earl Pollock
Protection of the individual from state denial of due process requires that
federal courts be empowered to intervene in state criminal matters through
the writ of habeas corpus.' On the other hand, comity in our dual judiciary
system requires that this power be exercised sparingly and with utmost self-
restraint.2 A balance of these conflicting interests--due process versus comity
-has led to the doctrine3 that, absent "exceptional circumstances of peculiar
urgency, "4 a district court will not entertain a state prisoner's application
for habeas corpus until all available state remedies have been exhausted. 5
The exhaustion doctrine was considerably expanded by two dicta appearing
in Ex Parte Hawk,6 a 1944 Supreme Court per curiam opinion. Each raised
an issue that has been a bone of contention in the federal courts ever since:
1) is a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court also a prerequisite?
2) and if so, what is the effect of the denial of certiorari on the prisoner's
subsequent application for habeas corpus?
According to the first Hawk dictum, raising the federal question in only
state tribunals was insufficient to establish eligibility for the federal remedy.
The prisoner must also petition the United States Supreme Court for
1. 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Supp. III 1950). For sketch of expanding use of the
writ in recent years, see Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal
Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945). For concise history and general discussion,
see Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1949)
Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1948).
2. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176,
182 (1884). See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv.
345 (1930).
3. See Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), and Mooney v. Holohon, 294 U.S.
103 (1935). Now codified as 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. III 1950) : "An application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an
absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. An appli-
cant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of
the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
4. United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925). An example is
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), involving a mob-dominated trial. Ex-
haustion of remedies is similarly unnecessary in a situation where a state attempts
to interfere improperly with the federal government. E.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1
(1889) (federal officer held in state custody for homicide committed in scope of
duty). See Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 692-693
(1948). The exhaustion requirement is of course satisfied if the state provides no
remedy. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
5. Thus resort to federal habeas corpus will not be allowed unless state courts
have adjudicated the precise point, e.g., Ex Parte Williams, 317 U.S. 604 (1943),
in the light of the latest controlling decision, e.g., Mackey v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 683
(1945), despite the apparent futility of applying again for state relief, e.g., Mooney
v. Holohon, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
6. 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The Court affirmed the denial of the writ by lower
federal courts, on the ground that Nebraska state remedies could not be deemed
exhausted until coram nobis had been attempted. Statements relating to the require-
ment that the prisoner must also apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari and
the effect of its denial were irrelevant to the holding and consequently obiter dicta.
For history of the extensive Hawk litigation, see Note, The Judicial Obstacle
Course, 29 Nm. L. Rav. 445 (1950).
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certiorari 7 to review the highest state court decision.8 The extra step in the
exhaustion process could be skipped only if the state decision might be
deemed to rest on some adequate non-federal ground. In that event, the
prisoner could apply directly to the district courts since the Supreme Court
would lack jurisdiction to grant certiorari.9
The general rule and its lone exception governed federal habeas corpus
practice' o until Wade v. Mayo," in 1948. The Court there rejected the
strict requirement of the extra step as often "futile procedure," but con-
ceded that the prisoner's failure to apply for certiorari might be a relevant
consideration for the district court in determining whether to take jurisdic-
tion.' 2 The authority of Wade v. Mayo was destined to be short-lived,
however. Only two years later it was impliedly over-ruled by Darr v. Bur-
ford,'8 which re-established the mandatory certiorari rule in all its force
and vigor. Basic to Darr v. Burford is a lurking fear of disturbing delicate
federal-state relations by permitting a single judge of the lowest federal
court to upset judgments of the highest state court.14 To avoid such em-
barrassing reversals, the Court insisted, it should be given the "first crack"
at passing upon charges of state violations of federal constitutional rights.'5
If the frst Hawk dictum makes federal habeas corpus relief more difficult
for the state prisoner, the second Hawk dictum would make such relief nearly
7. Cases come to the Supreme Court by two main routes: appeal and certiorari.
Appeal is theoretically of right, while certiorari is totally discretionary. ROBERTSON
AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE tUNITED STATES
(2d ed., Wolfson and Kurland, 1951) is the most comprehensive work on this
subject. See also Boskey, Mechanics of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction,
46 COL. L. REv. 255 (1946).
8. Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944). Five cases were cited in support
of this dictum. Two are authority only for the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
available in state courts. Ex Parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219 (1943); Mooney v.
Holohon, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). The other three required that a petitioner be"put to his writ of error." United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13
(1925); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 US
101 (1898). But there is considerable difference between the now-obsolete writ
of error and a writ of certiorari. A writ of error was a writ of right and would
be granted automatically. A writ of certiorari, on the other hand, is a writ of
grace and is wholly discretionary with the Supreme Court.
9. Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1944). Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 125-126 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 477-8 (1945). ROBERTSON
AND KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 163.
10. The Supreme Court caused copies of the Hawk opinion to be distributed
among inmates of state penitentiaries. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 211
(1950). The dictum was approved in House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), and
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). The result was to flood the Supreme Court
with prison-drawn petitions for certiorari from state convicts. ROBERTSON AND
KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 749.
11. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
12. 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948).
13. 339 U.S. 200, 210 (1950): "Whatever deviation Wade may imply from the
established rule will be corrected by this decision."
14. 339 U.S. 200, 206-207 (1950).
15. 339 U.S. 200, 216 (1950). The Court rationalized that Congress gave-this
policy legislative sanction by enacting Section 2254 of the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code. See note 3 supra. This appears to have been the intention of the
Judicial Conference committee that drafted the section. See Parker, Limiting the
Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176-177 (1949). But this statute states
only the undoubted rule that a state prisoner must exhaust "the remedies available
in the courts of the State." (Italics added.) Unless the Supreme Court of the
United States could somehow be placed in the category of "courts of the State,"
there is nothing in the statute itself to indicate that certiorari is also a prerequisite
step. The Reviser's Note is similarly ambiguous: "This new section is declaratory
1951]
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impossible: "Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the
merits of his contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to
review the state court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-examine
upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. ' 16 The rule is
undoubtedly correct in those cases in which the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari and adjudicated the issues on their merits,17 even though res
judicata is inapplicable in habeas corpus cases.38 But it is much more likely
that certiorari will be denied, 19 and, under present Supreme Court procedure,
of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (See Ex Parte Hawk . . .)"
It is true that a dictum in Hawk required certiorari, but the case actually turned
on the failure of the prisoner to exhaust a remedy available in state courts. See
note 6 supra. Furthermore, Wade v. Mayo came down only two days before the
enactment of the statute, and its effect on the Hawk rule could not have been
considered by the draftsmen, the Reviser, or either House of Congress. During
the two-year span between Wade v. Mayo and Darr v. Burford, lower federal
courts interpreted Section 2254 to mean that certiorari was not part of the exhaus-
tion process Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Collingsworth v.
Mayo, 173 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1949). In view of the unmistakably plain language
of the statute, unchallenged by any convincing proof of a contrary Congressional
intent, the latter interpretation would seem to be correct. See MooRE, COMMENTARY
ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 449 (1949).
16. Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944). The only case cited in support
of this dictum was Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-232 (1924). This case
held that, although res judicata does not extend to a decision refusing to discharge
the prisoner on an application for habeas corpus raising the same contentions,
a district court may in its discretion give that decision controlling weight, depending
on "the character of the court or officer to whom the first application was made,
and the fullness of the consideration given to it." In the light of the quoted
proviso, a denial of certiorari could hardly be deemed equivalent to a decision
based on a full-dress hearing on the merits. Certiorari is frequently denied for
reasons quite unrelated to the merits, and a district judge may at best only speculate
as to the reasons for the Court's action. See note 20 infra.
17. If the conviction is reversed, the prisoner has won at least a new trial;
and if the conviction is sustained, proper respect for the superior tribunal would
probably bar relitigation.
18. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101, 105 (1942). A district court may, however, refuse to entertain a petition for
habeas corpus if a federal court had previously denied a similar petition on its
merits, and if "the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry." 28 U.S.C.
§2244 (Supp. III 1950), codifying the principle laid down in Salinger v. Loisel,
supra note 16.
19. Petitioners for certiorari must either (1) pay the regular docketing fee and
printing costs or (2) accompany their petition with a motion in forma pauperis.
Of the first category, the Court granted only 14.9% of the 652 petitions filed in
1947-48, 21.6% of the 667 petitions filed in 1948-49, and 13.3% of the 640 petitions
filed in 1949-50. Petitions in the second category are considered together with
the motion in forma pauperis. If the petition for certiorari is denied, no ruling on
the motion is made. STERaN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 150 (1950).
The Court granted only 17 (4%) of 417 such petitions filed in 1947-48, 18 (4%)
of the 443 filed in 1948-49, and 7 (1.6%) of the 436 filed in 1949-50. RoBERTsOl
AND K.IEHAM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 580-81; Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 114, 158
(1950). Most in forma pauperis petitions come from state prisoners who challenge
the legality of their convictions. During the three years preceding the 1949 October
Term, for example, 49% came from Illinois State prisoners alone. Chief Justice
Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, an address before the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Sept. 7, 1949, printed in 69 Sup. Ct V, ViI-VIII (1949). For the reasons
underlying the "procedural morass" in Illinois, see Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561,
563 (1947) (concurring opinion); Comment, Collateral Relief from Convictions in
Violation of Due Process in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 329 (1947). This Illinois situ-
ation has presumably been improved by the passage of the Post Conviction Act.
ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, §§826-832 (1949). See Notes, 10 J. CXtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
606 (1950), 41 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (1950).
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for reasons quite unrelated to the merits of the case.20 Furthermore, these
reasons are usually not made explicit.2 ' What legal significance, then, should
a lower federal court attach to such denial when the prisoner later applies
for habeas corpus?
The Court has traditionally insisted that " . the denial of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion on the merits. "22 Despite an occasional
note of skepticism,23 this had been the generally accepted rule-at least until
Ex Parte Hawk.24 The dictum was later approved in Supreme Court de-
cisions25 and generally followed in the lower federal courts.2 6 In Darr v.
20. "The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with
the correction of errors in lower court decisions... The function of the Supreme
Court is, therefore, to resolve conflict of opinion on federal questions that have
arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory
power over lower federal courts." Chief Justice Vinson, supra note 19, at VI. See
Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. Rule 38.5
1946). Reasons which may motivate a Justice to vote against a petition include:
1) the time may not be favorable for a decision on a particular issue of national
concern; (2) the issue may appear too moribund for adjudication, or it might
become so later on; (3) it may appear desirable to have different aspects of an
issue further illumined by the lower courts; (4) a certiorari petition may have
already been granted in a case involving the same issue presented more clearly
or in conjunction with other issues the Court feels should also be considered; (5)
the constitutional issue may be so entangled with non-constitutional issues so as
to raise doubt whether the constitutional issue could be effectively isolated; (6)
the record may be cloudy; (7) the condition of the Court calendar; (8) fear that
if certiorari were granted, five or more Justices might decide the issue wrongly
and set a bad precedent! ROBERTSON AND KntmxAM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 603-
605; STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcricE 132-133 (1950); Harper and
Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An Appraisal
of Certiorari, 99 U. of PA. L. Rxv. 293, 299-300 (1950).
21. "It has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude .. . If the Court is to do its work,
it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive, apart from the fact ... that
different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in con-
cluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable." Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
22. Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
See also Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403-404 (1931); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. &
Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916). Mr. Justice Frankfurter has emphasized that "'...
all that a denial of a petition for certiorari means is that fewer than four members
of the Court thought it should be granted." State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338
U.S. 912, 919 (1950). For background of this "rule of four," see Boskey, supra
note 7, at 257.
23. At least one commentator on Supreme Court practice contends that the
denial of certiorari is coming to mean tacit approval of the decision below. Frank,
The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1948) ;
Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 1, 38-39
(1949). But "(a)Ithough it be true that the Supreme Court may frequently refuse to
review a case because a quick examination of the record indicates that the decision
is not erroneous, it is extremely hazardous to conclude in any particular case that
the reason fdr denying certiorari was the correctness of the decision." (Italics
added.) RoBERsoN AND KIRKHAM, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 604-605.
24. 321 U.S. 114 (1944). "Only in one instance-where certiorari has been
denied as a result of an attempt to exhaust the state remedies-is there any possi-
bility that the denial of certiorari may have an effect of which a lower court
should be cognizant." ROBEaTSON AND KIRKIHAM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 605.
25. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764-765 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42,
48 (1945) semble. In the latter opinion, the Hawk dictum was preceded by a state-
ment of the orthodox rule on the effect of a certiorari denial. These two propo-
1951]
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Burford,2" although ostensibly sidestepping the issue on the ground its dis-
position would be only dictum, the Opinion of the Court included language
intimating that the denial of certiorari may subsequently guide district
court action.28 Both concurring Justices refused to acce],t the implication of
this language and joined the three dissenters, together constituting a majority,
in repudiating any deviation from the orthodox rule on the effect of a
certiorari denial.
29
This division of the Court and the ambiguous language in the opinion made
confusion in the lower federal courts inevitable. Three different theories
have evolved: 1) that a denial of certiorari is conclusive on the merits of a
subsequent application for habeas corpus; 2) that a denial may be given sub-
stantive weight in the discretion of the district court; 3) that a denial is to be
given no substantive weight whatever.
1) Giving denial conclusive effect. The first is illustrated by Goodwin v.
Smyth.30 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's
denial of habeas corpus on the ground there was no allegation of "unusual
circumstances" as would justify a lower federal court in granting the writ
when that relief had been denied by the highest court of the state and certio-
rari had been refused by the Supreme Court.3 1 Such "unusual circumstan-
ces" 82 would arise in cases where the state corrective process had failed to
afford the prisoner a full and fair adjudication of his federal contentions.83 In
sitions cannot be reconciled. If a denial of certiorari imports no opinion on the
merits, why then should it bar district courts from subsequently re-examining
the prisoner's contentions on petition for habeas corpus?
26. E.g., Schechtman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949); Stonebreaker v.
Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947); Bird v. Smith, 175 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1949) ; United States ex tel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949). The
opinion in the latter case was written by Judge Sherman Minton, then of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Shortly after his elevation to the Supreme
Court, the case was overruled by United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd, 180 F.2d
212 (7th Cir. 1950), which held that a denial of certiorari should be given no sub-
stantive effect whatever.
27. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
28. Id. at 215: "Even after this Court has declined to review a state judgment
denying relief, other federal courts have power to act on a new application by the
prisoner. On that application, the court may require a showing of the record and
action on prior applications, and may decline to examine further into the merits
because they have already been decided against the petitioner. Thus, there is
avoided abuse of the writ by repeated attempts to secure a hearing on frivolous
grounds, and repeated adjudications of the same issues by courts of co-ordinate
powers. In this way the record on certiorari in this Court is brought to the attention
of the trial court." Id. at 214: "Whether a refusal to grant certiorari imports an
opinion on any issue or not, the reason persists for requiring an application here
from the state refusal before application to another federal court."
29. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the case. Thus, of the eight Justices
sitting, five (JJ's Reed, Vinson, Minton, Clark, and Burton) officially approved the
first Hawk dictum that a petition for certiorari is a prerequisite to federal habeas
corpus; while five (Frankfurter, Black, Jackson, Clark, and Burton), although not
speaking for the Court, refused to follow the second Hawk dictum on the effect
of a certiorari denial.
30. 181 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1950).
31. Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947), is the leading Fourth
Circuit decision applying this principle. Others: Holiday v. State of Maryland, 177
F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1949); Goodman v. Swenson, 173 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1949);
Davis v. Smyth, 167 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1948).
32. Compare with the "exceptional circumstances" needed to avoid the exhaus-
tion requirement altogether (note 4 supra) and the circumstances necessary to
avoid the certiorari step in the exhaustion process (note 9 supra).
33. Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947), relying on House v.
Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), and White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Section 2254
[Vol. 42
CERTIORARI.AND HABEAS CORPUS
that event, the denial of certiorari would be meaningless since the Supreme
Court lacks jurisdiction to review a state deci§ion which might be deemed to
rest on adequate non-federal grounds.34 Absent such circumstances, the denial
would be conclusive. 35
This approach, as extreme as it might appear to be, simply carries the two
Hawk dicta to their logical conclusion. After all, the basic purpose of the
"first crack" policy is to dispose of valid charges of state denial of due process
before they reach the district court level where a reversal of the state convic-
tion might prove embarrassing.3 6 To accomplish this purpose, the policy
presupposes that the Supreme Court will scrutinize each state prisoner's
application for certiorari on its merits, sift out the wheat from the chaff, grant
certiorari if federal relief is indicated, and then adjudicate the constitutional
issues itself. An inescapable corollary is that certiorari will be denied if the
Supreme Court finds that federal relief should, not be granted. And of course
if the denial of certiorari constitutes a rejection of the prisoner's contentions
on the merits, it would be presumptuous for a lower federal court to re-
examine those contentions in habeas corpus proceedings.
The Goodwin approach has several obvious advantages. The danger of what
might be deemed unseemly interference in state criminal matters by lower
federal courts is avoided. Also, heavily-docketed district courts would be
relieved of an onerous administrative burden.
3 7
But the net effect of such a doctrine, coupled with the mandatory certiorari
rule, is to divest lower federal courts of a large part of their habeas corpus
jurisdiction over state prisoners.3 8 For, until the prisoner has applied for
certiorari, his petition for habeas corpus will not be entertained; and if
certiorari is denied, the writ will not be granted. Presumably the only excep-
tions, aside from "unusual circumstances," would be those rare instances
where the Supreme Court expressly indicates its reason for denying certio-
rari,3 9 or stated that its denial was "without prejudice" to the petitioner's
right to later invoke the habeas corpus remedy in the district courts.40 The
"unusual circumstances" exception would of course probably cover all cases
where the prisoner has been unable to obtain a hearing in the state courts on
(note 3 supra) forbids a district court from granting habeas corpus except in one
of three situations: (1) where the prisoner has exhausted all available state
remedies; (2) where the state provides no reinedy; (3) where circumstances exist
rendering such a remedy ineffective. Under the stricter Goodwin approach, a
district court is barred from granting such relief except in only the second or
third situations.
34. See citations in note 9 supra.
35. In Schechtman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge Learned
Hand took the same position. Accord: Bird v. Smith, 175 F.2nd 260 (9th Cir.
1949); Jones v. Mayo, 86 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
36. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 217 (1950) : "It is this Court's conviction
that orderly federal procedure under our dual system of government demands that
the states' highest courts should ordinarily be subject to reversal only by this
Court.. Y
37. See statistics at note 57 infra.
38. This is the admitted aim of this approach. See Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176-178 (1949), written by the Hon. John J. Parker, Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
39. See note 21 supra.
40. If certiorari is denied "without prejudice," the effect is to reaffirm in that
particular case the orthodox rule on the effect of a certiorari denial. In the absence
of such a phrase, however, there is no negative implication that the denial is with
prejudice, and the prisoner is not thereby prevented from seeking other avenues




the factual issues involved because of the inadequacy of the state remedies
afforded.
4 1
In all other cases,4 2 the Supreme Court's "first crack" at the constitutional
question would also be the prisoner's last chance for federal relief. Confronted
with this now-or-never plight of the prisoner, the Court would be compelled
to either ignore many instances of state denial of due process, or else radically
alter its methods of disposing of certiorari applications. For, under present
practice, contrary to the basic assumption of the Goodwin approach, certiorari
is frequently denied for reasons immaterial to the merits of the claim.4 3 If
district courts could not thereafter grant habeas corpus relief, the Court would
have to pass on the merits of each petition for certiorari that attacked the
constitutionality of a state criminal conviction. In addition, there would be
strong pressure to grant certiorari in borderline cases. Such a drastic increase
in the court's volume of business would be directly contrary to its recent
marked tendency to reduce its work load."
2) Giving the denial discretionary weight. Other courts have taken a more
equivocal position. An example is Holland v. Eidson.4 5 Apparently relying in
part on the discretionary nature of habeas corpus and in part on the prior
denial of certiorari, the court refused the writ without even inquiring into the
merits of the petition.
4 6
Under this approach, which seems most in accord with the Darr opinion,
4 7
giving a certiorari denial any substantive weight is discretionary with the
district court; under the Goodwin approach, giving the denial a conclusive
effect is mandatory. Despite the apparent dissimilarity, the two theories are
likely to yield the same results. The state prisoner must already contend with
a number of subterranean influences tending to predispose a federal judge
to deny the writ: the extreme abuse of the writ by state convicts,48 the small
percentage of claims which have proved valid,49 the generally over-crowded
district court dockets, the previous adjudications of the prisoner's claim in
state courts, the desire to minimize interference in state matters, perhaps a
previous denial of habeas corpus by a federal court.50 If the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari is added to these considerations, most lower federal courts
would probably exercise their discretionary authority adversely to the
prisoner. No glaring procedural defect appearing that might otherwise
41. See note 33 supra.
42. In these cases, the prisoner has presumably had a fair hearing on the facts
in the state courts, but either contests the ruling of the state court on the factual
issues or alleges that his detention is illegal because of an error of law committed
by the state court
43. See note 20 supra.
44. See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 1, 39-40 (1950); Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did ITot
Do in the 1949 Term-An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293, 296-
297 (1950).
45. 90 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
46. Id. at 315: "The same reasons that prompted the Supreme Court of the
United States to deny certiorari would warrant this court in refusing to entertain
the application." Accord: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Gibbs v. Ashe,
93 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
47. See note 28 supra. Note that Darr disavows any intent to attach a conclusive
effect to a denial of certiorari, but suggests rather that substantive reasons for
the denial might be inferred from the record.
48. See Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313
(1948) ; Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
49. See statistics in note 57 infra.
50. See note 18 supra.
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account for the Supreme Court's action, it would be a simple matter to take
the path of least resistance and refuse relief.
The difficulty with the Holland approach stems from its fundamental
premise-that a district court judge is sufficiently clairvoyant to infer from
the record the reasons for the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.51 Under
present Supreme Court procedure this premise is simply not true;5 2 and
to make it true would entail the same administrative problems inherent in
the Goodwin approach. The Supreme Court would have to either pass on the
merits of each petition for certiorari or explain its reasons for each denial of
certiorari. Without such a radical change in certiorari procedure, relief
for many deserving petitioners would be effectively foreclosed.
3) Giving the denial no substantive weight whatever. A third group of
courts have adhered to the orthodox rule on the effect of a certiorari denial.
An example is Coggins v. O'Brien.53 The court refused to attach any legal
significance whatever to a prior denial of certiorari, except to note that the
prisoner had satisfied a procedural prerequisite to eligibility for federal
habeas corpus.
54
If then a denial of certiorari is to. be ignored- as to the merits of the
prisoner's claim, why require certiorari at all? Surely a reversal of the
highest state court by a single federal district judge after the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari is no less detrimental to federal-state comity than a
reversal before the denial. An outraged state judiciary would hardly be
placated by assurance that the prisoner was at least compelled to go through
some extra red tape before being given his freedom.
Of course, in those few cases in which certiorari is granted, the prisoner's
claim will be settled once and for all. But it is likely under present Supreme
Court procedure that most state prisoners who are entitled to federal relief
are nevertheless denied certiorari, and must still seek redress on the district
court level, if at all.
The result of the (oggins approach then is to vastly increase the number of
petitions to the Supreme Court for certiorari without appreciably reducing the
frequency of district court reversals of state convictions.
Conclusions. However, if a choice must be made between the three theories,
the Coggins approach appears to be the least noxious. By adhering to the
orthodox rule on the effect of a certiorari denial, it does the best it can with
a difficult situation created by making a petition for certiorari a condition
precedent to federal habeas corpus.
This is the dilemma: Either 1) a denial of certiorari may be given sub-
stantive weight, or 2) it may not be given substantive weight. The first
alternative would oblige the Supreme Court to examine each petition for
certiorari on its merits or make explicit its reasons for denying certiorari.
The consequences would be an almost impossible burden on the Court. The
second alternative, illustrated by (oggins, would simply add a meaningless
51. See Holland v. Eidson, 90 F. Supp. 314, 315 (1950): "The Supreme Court,
always solicitous of the rights of the individual, did not perceive upon the record
presented to it any grounds for the issuance of a writ of certiorari."
52. See note 20 supra.
53. 188 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1951).
54. This seems to be the position taken by the two concurring Justices in Darr
v. Burford: require an application for certiorari, but attach no substantive weight
to its denial. See also United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100 (E.D.
Pa. 1951). Accord: Goodman v. Lainson, 182 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1950) ("special
circumstances" not necessary for habeas corpus after prisoner has exhausted state
remedies and applied for certiorari).
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and cumbersome step to the routine of establishing eligibility for federal
habeas corpus.
The "first crack" policy has an admittedly worthwhile purpose-the
avoidance of friction in federal-state relations. Implicit in such a policy,
however, is the dubious assumption that the release of a prisoner by the
Supreme Court is less obnoxious to the states than a release ordered by a
district court.55 The ultimate decision rests with the higher federal courts
anyway, since a state can appeal the granting of the writ.56 But if the fears
of its proponents are at all justified,57 a better solution might lie in the
proposal of past Conferences of Senior Circuit Judges that a three-judge
district court be used where federal habeas corpus is sought attacking a state
commitment. 58  This would at least spare state appellate tribunals the
supposed indignity of being reversed by a single federal district judge.
Furthermore, even under Wade v. Mayo,5 9 a district court that felt its re-
lease of a state prisoner on writ of habeas corpus would touch a state sore
spot could in its discretion dismiss the petition because of the prisoner's
failure to first apply for certiorari. In such cases, the Supreme Court would
in effect have its highly desired "first crack" at the prisoner's claim, and,
if it refused to take jurisdiction, the district court could then grant the
necessary relief as a last resort.
It seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will soon be called upon to
resolve this three-cornered conflict in the lower courts. 60 When that time
comes, the two Hawk dicta should finally be put to rest, and the more flexible
Wade doctrine re-established.
55. See, e.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 217 (1950).
56. 28 U.S.C. §2253 (Supp. III 1950).
57. Federal district judges have not yet shown any propensity to "open wide
the State prison doors." During the five fiscal years from 1945 through 1950, there
were 2,723 habeas corpus cases involving state prisoners disposed of by district
courts. Of this number, only 66, or 2.4%, of all petitioners were successful. Nor
was there any marked increase in this proportion during the two years in which
Wade v. Mayo governed federal habeas corpus practice. District courts released
only 10 (1.6%) of 610 state applicants in 1948-49, and 18 (2.8%) of 642 state
applicants in 1949-50. It is also probable that some of these few successful peti-
tioners were retried and then properly recommitted. Data taken from Speck,
Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 357 (1949), and
letter from W. H. Speck, Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts, dated August 1, 1951.
58. Report of the Judicial Conference, Rep. Att'y Gen. 67-68 (1943).
59. 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948).
60. First Circuit: No substantive effect. Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130
(1951).
Second Circuit: Conclusive. Schechtman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (1949).
Third Circuit: Eastern District of Pennsylvania, no substantive effect. United
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100 (1951). Western District of Penn-
sylvania, discretionary substantive effect. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel.
Gibbs v. Ashe, 93 F. Supp. 542 (1950).
Fourth Circuit: Conclusive. Goodwin v. Smyth, 181 F.2d 498 (1950).
Fifth Circuit: Southern District of Florida, conclusive. Jones v. Mayo, 86 F.
Supp. 849 (1949). See also Bailey v. Stoutamire, 155 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1946)
semble.
Sixth Circuit: No reported cases in point.
Seventh Circuit: No substantive effect. United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd, 180
F.2d 212 (1950).
Eighth Circuit: No substantive effect. Goodman v. Lainson, 182 F.2d 814
(1950). But cf. Holland v. Eidson, 90 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (discretionary
substantive effect).
Ninth Circuit: Conclusive. Bird v. Smith, 175 F.2d 260 (1949).
Tenth Circuit: No reported cases in point.
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